For some, SSF has provided a shield against numerous political conflicts and disturbances in the West Africa

region. In 1989 for example, Upper-Guinea experienced dramatic population in-migration following the onset of fighting in Liberia [27]. By 1995, the total estimated refugee population in Guinea alone was over 500,000, and despite a series of cease-fires and peace agreements, the prospects for repatriation remained bleak. Cabuno camp indeed highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between ‘migrant fisher’ and ‘political refugee who happens to fish’. This challenge remains central, given that various re-current political crises in this region today render moving off the Bijagós Archipelago a formidable proposition. For many ‘Late Starter (push)’ entrants SSF has provided a ‘last-resort’ option [49]. However, these workers also harbour multiple-skills, entrepreneurship and adaptable employment experience.

Findings from selleck screening library Cabuno camp therefore question the use of the term ‘unskilled’ in describing those for whom fishing is a ‘last resort’. Other ‘late starters’ to SSF describe a new monetary appeal. This is not altogether surprising given that unemployment in the region is rife [42]. Some fish catch groups provide cheap protein supplies; others are subject to significant growth in global demand and value [16] and [61]. That former diamond miners are now fishing illustrates this fact [6]. For these ‘Late Starter (pull)’ members, entry emerges as a calculated decision not based upon circumstances of threat in IDH phosphorylation the midst of conflict, but personal interpretations of financial gain. As exemplified elsewhere, it is therefore not only the immediate influence of war, but also the resounding effects of

economies recovering after war and available alternative employment options Enzalutamide which can influence movements into fishing [64]. At the juncture between wealth and welfare approaches to SSF management, ‘hard choices’ still linger [11] and [14]. Empirical evidence from Cabuno contributes to this debate by indicating that attempts to capture any ‘inherent wealth’ [90] will most likely gloss-over broader fisheries management problems inside the Bijagós region. This is explained in terms of three main factors. Firstly, over several successive decades of region-wide post-colonial conflict and political upheaval, SSF has presented a critical opportunity (a safety-net or alternative labour opportunity) to trained and displaced workers from West African tertiary (service) industries [14]. Furthermore, access to SSF has lessened the burden of poverty for these workers and their dependents [46]. These life-histories of Cabuno camp residents, which illustrate extensive geographic, temporal and occupational mobility in addition to region-wide fishing experience, do not therefore support the notion that simple access-restrictions to the ‘unskilled’ will solve wider fisheries problems in this locale [85].